Important Battles of the Swiss | - | Swiss Military System and Tactics | - | Bibliography |
Dungeons & Dragons | - | Dragon magazine | - | The Dragon #22 |
Gary informs us that while “Gygax is an ancient Swiss name,” the
name means “see-saw,” or “up-and-down,” in Macedonian. In any
event, the author’s father was born in Canton Bern, Switzerland,
so he is
more than usually interested in the military history of that country.
The three “Forest Cantons” concluded an “Everlasting League” in
1291 A.D. Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden defied the Hapsburg counts
and set upon a course of independence which would eventually
establish modern day Switzerland. The process would involve them in
numerous wars in self defense, aggression, and even civil strife. In
general,
these districts has an historical basis of self-rule directly under
the
German Holy Roman Emperor. What seems to have triggered the Confederates’
struggle for complete independence is connected with the rise
of a petty noble family from the same area. The Hapsburg family of
Aargau were becoming powerful landlords, and they claimed rights in
the League’s area which the Confederates refused to yield. The League
supported rivals of the Hapsburgs for election as Emperor, and the
dispute
eventually resulted in the Battle of Morgarten in 1315. The
Hapsburg Leopold I of Austria led an army purported to number
15,000 into the Valley of Schwyz. This force was strung out along a
narrow,
icy road paralleling Lake Aegeri, and Swiss mountaineers, said to
have numbered only 1,500, first rolled boulders and logs upon the invaders
from their ambush, and then fell upon the head of the column,
slaughtering the knights and routing the foot behind. The Confederates
won for themselves virtual independence by this crushing defeat of
Duke Leopold, but this was certainly no guarantee of immunity from
further aggression from the powers (Austria, France, Burgundy, Savoy,
Germany, Milan) which surrounded the little territories, nor did it
spell
any slackening of desire on the part of the Swiss to confine their
domain
to the lands gained by the victory at Morgarten.
The Bernese (or Berners) allied with the three Forest Cantons and
were a major factor in the next major battle fought, Laupen, in 1339,
against a Burgundian force invading the Aar valley. While the men of
Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden employed many halberds (as well as
morning stars and two-handed swords), their new allies favored the
pike, and it was these Berners and their associates who turned the
tide at
Laupen — overcoming the Burgundian foot and then driving off the
cavalry pressing upon the halberd-armed contingent of herdsman from
the Forest Cantons. This battle was decisive enough to win a respite
of
several decades, and during this time the Confederacy grew by the additions
of Luzern (1332), Zurich (1351), Glarus (1352), Zug (1352), and
Bern (1353). Note that these dates are when these areas joined the
league as formal members (although not necessarily as allies of each
member), not the dates of first co-operation or alliance with the Forest
Cantons. The Confederation grew to include Fribourg (1481) and
Solothurn (1481), then Basel (1501) and Schaffhausen (1501), and
finally Appenzell (1513). Territory which was granted cantonal status
later (Aargau, Graubunden, St. Gallen, Thurgau, Ticino, and Vaud in
1803; Geneve, Neuchatel, and Valais in 1815) was under Swiss control
or associated as allies, by and large, during the 14th or 15th Centuries;
for the various members of the Ancient League of High Germany, (the
Swiss) often provoked attack by their territorial acquisitions. This
is not
to say that the citizens of the areas which the Confederates acquired
were conquered peoples, for even as dependents of a member of the
Confederacy they were far better off than under the feudal suzerains
of
France, Germany, etc.
Important Battles of the Swiss
A brief listing of the major battles for national sovereignty fought
by the
Swiss after Laupen contains a dozen engagements:
Year | Battle | War | Victor | Special Feature or Result |
1386 | Sempach | Austrian-Swiss | Swiss | Leopold III killed |
1388 | Nafels | Austrian-Swiss | Swiss | Ambush with logs and boulders a la Mortgarden |
1422 | Arbedo | Swiss-Milanese | Milan | Condottiere dismount to fight as infantry using their lances as pikes |
1444 | St. Jacoben Birs | French Invasion | France | 600 Swiss die to a man fighting 30,000, French lose 2,000 and turn back |
1474 | Hericourt | Swiss-Burgundian | Swiss | - |
1476 | Grandson | Swiss-Burgundian | Swiss | - |
1476 | Morat | Swiss-Burgundian | Swiss | - |
1477 | Nancy | Swiss-Burgundian | Swiss | Charles the Rash killed, Burgundy absorbed by the French. |
1478 | Giarnico | Swiss-Milanese | Swiss | - |
1499 | Frastenz | Swiss-Swabian | Swiss | - |
1499 | Calven | Swiss-Swabian | Swiss | Graubunden becomes independent |
1499 | Dornach | Swiss-Swabian | Swiss | Last invasion of Swiss territory until the Napoleonic Era |
The many Swiss victories so enhanced the repute
of the phalanxes of Confederate
infantry, that all the nations of Europe roundabout
enlisted corps of
mercenary Swiss pikemen and halberdiers — furnished,
of course, by the
various cantons. Switzerland had at last found
an exportable commodity which
brought them silver in return. The notable battles
they engaged in were:
Battle | Opponent | Result |
1502, Barletta | Spain | Swiss pikemen defeated by sword and buckler infantryman at close quarters; first French loss to Spain |
1513, Novara I | French | Swiss break rival landsknechte formation
to win battle and slay all the German prisoners. |
1515, Marignamo | French | Swiss forced into square by cavalry charges
while cannons play on their formations; they withdraw |
1522, La Bicocca | Holy Roman Empire | Swiss charge entrenched landsknechte, and in the ensuing attempt to gain the upper works lose 3,000 men and retire |
1525, Pavia V | Holy Roman Empire | French and Swiss besieging city are weak-
ened by musketry and then driven from the field by Spanish sword and buckler infantry |
Switzerland became independent because its “rude farmers and
herdsmen” took up arms and fought. This infantry faced all sorts of
opponents,
including the superbly armored feudal heavy cavalry, and won
with ease. The “loss” of the battle at St. Jacob-en Birs shook the
French
Dauphine to the core, for his cavalry was helpless against the Swiss,
and
it was through repeated missile volleys and dint of costly fighting
that his
army finally overcame a mere handful of infantry who refused to yield.
The lances of the dismounted cavalry of Carmagnola at the Battle of
Arbedo, as well as their better armor, nearly won the day for the
Milanese, and the Swiss certainly withdrew with alacrity, but thereafter
a
greater percentage of pike (rather than halberd) armed troops were
in
each contingent of Swiss who took the field. During the Swiss-Swabian
War (beginning in 1498), a body of 600 pikemen were caught in the
open by the Swabian horse formed a “hedgehog” and repelled the
enemy charges with “much laughing and jesting” — the infantry was
outnumbered by nearly two to one. The reputation of absolute
fearlessness, terrible ferocity in battle, and the irresistible onset
of the
pike squares caused the Swiss to become the most feared, imitated,
and
admired troops in Medieval Europe. They too must have begun to
believe that “God is on the side of the Confederates.” They took the
same attitude in battle when serving as mercenary troops, and for a
short
time after they were totally independent, they remained the arbiters
of
battle. While the Swiss certainly were instrumental in bringing infantry
back into ascendency over cavalry, changing modes of warfare also
doomed their arms to come to ruin as the Renaissance began. They
defeated the great powers which surrounded Switzerland and won
freedom with their halberds and pikes, but on later fields of battle
the
Swiss found that generalship eventually prevails over outmoded tactics
no matter the elan or bravery of the soldiers using them.
Swiss Military System and Tactics
The men of the three original cantons were primarily halberdiers.
The troops from the lower lands of the Confederation — Berners,
Lucerners, and others from the Aar Valley favored the pike. With these
infantrymen were numbers of light troops, crossbow or arquibus armed
skirmishers. There was never a significant number of cavalry in a Swiss
national force, although there were some such troops furnished by the
knights and gentry of Canton Bern. Where possible, the Swiss made use
of artillery, although their typical swift movement through hilly and
mountainous terrain precluded this most of the time. A typical Swiss
field army would be composed as follows:
Troop Type | Weapon | Percentage of Force |
infantry | halberd | 20%-60% |
infantry | lucern hammer, morningstar, or two-handed sword | 10%-20% |
infantry | pike | 10%-65% |
infantry | crossbow | 5%-30% |
infantry | arquibus | 5%-25% |
Halberdiers predominate in early battles, but later they become
fewer,
and c. 1450 they form the center of the pike squares and represent
only
20% to 30% of the total force.
Lucern hammers, morning stars, and two-handed swords were eventually
abandoned totally by the Swiss in favor of the halberd. Forces c.
1450 and after will have few (if any at all) of such weapons, the morning
star being the first to be abandoned.
Pikes begin to dominate the Swiss arms after Arbedo (1422), and
thereafter at least 50% of their force are so armed.
Crossbows give way to arquibuses c. 1450, although it is likely
that some
persisted until 1500.
Cavalry fielded was typical of the period, armored riders bearing
lance
and various secondary arms. It is doubtful that the Swiss ever fielded
more than a few score cavalry, so an upward limit of 100 to 200 must
be
placed upon the percentage maximum.
Swiss infantry were generally lightly armored. This was initially due
to the fact that they could afford none, but the benefits of mobility
soon
gave the Confederates the determination not to add such encumbrance
to their formations. Officers wore full panoply and rode to battle
in order
to keep pace with the rest. Halberdiers and the like wore metal helmets,
cuirasses or metal or leather, and a few also wore light greaves. Most
pikemen wore felt hats or metal helmets and padded or leather
cuirasses. Only the front rank or two of any phalanx had metal armor.
Light infantry were similarly equipped, although most were totally
unprotected
save for helmet and leather cuirass.
Logistics were no problem for the Swiss. Within two to four days,
each area could raise its levy and be ready to march, each man carrying
a few day’s supply of food with him (the rest could be scavenged from
the land). The bodies of troops then marched swiftly to predesignated
meeting places, joined, and were in the field and ready for battle
far
more quickly than any invader could hope to counter. As mentioned
previously, the leaders of the contingents rode, so that their heavy
plate
armor would not slow the infantrymen. As these levies were national,
each man knew his neighbor in formation and often elected their
leaders. Each man knew his place and what to do.
The sight of a Swiss column must have been impressive indeed, for
it moved so quickly but looked like a forest with the tall pikes held
upright
except towards the front and the dozens of banners — perhaps the great
white cross of the Ancient League of High Germany accompanying the
cantonal, town, district, guild and association flags. These phalanxes
moved without noise, except when the troops gave voice to their battle
shout just before impacting upon the enemy — or fending off fruitless
attacks
by desperate cavalry. Since the enemy knew full well that the Swiss
would give no quarter and that they were absolutely determined to
triumph, it took great discipline and courage indeed to stand before
the
onslaught of such troops.
Tactics employed by the Confederates were at first fresh and
innovative. The Flemish at Courttai (1302) used pikemen to defeat the
horsed chivalry of France, but this was due to skillful positioning
of the
infantry so as to take advantage of the waterways and soft ground,
as
well as the French failure to allow their mercenary Genoese crossbowmen
employment, as Mons-en Pevele (1304) and Cassel (1328) amply
prove. The mountaineers of the Forest Cantons likewise used terrain,
plus surprise by ambush and avalanched boulders and logs (much as
their ancient kinsmen had before them) to defeat heavy cavalry.
Although few pikemen were involved, the men of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden
formed a solid phalanx to fall upon the head of the Austrian
column and complete the work prepared by the ground and ambush.
Morgarten was a battle in which the Swiss showed extraordinary tactical
skill, and this unusual demonstration of ability continued.
At Laupen, the Burgundians squared off against infantry totally
unsupported by cavalry. Perhaps they envisioned treating the Swiss
to
the same rough handling the French had given the Flemish just eleven
years earlier. This battle is worth discussion in some detail, for
it is the
first in which the Swiss used three phalanxes (Vorhut, Gewaltshaufen,
Nachhut) in echelon to confront the enemy — a deployment which
became
the rule after 1339. Count Gerard of Vallangin commanded a
feudal array of Burgundian horse and foot which numbered 15,000.
With it he invaded Confederate territory and laid siege to the town
of
Laupen, near Bern. The Swiss rapidly rose a relief force and marched
to
a position on high ground which overlooked the besieging force.
Rudolph von Erlach was in sole command of the Swiss army (an
unusual situation), and he arrayed it with the halberdiers of the Forest
Cantons in the left phalanx, the Bernese pikemen the center, and
Bernese allies the right. The Burgundians deployed all of their horse
opposite the Swiss left (perhaps noting that this square did not have
many pikes, as the latter weapon is obvious from a great distance)
and
were allowed to begin advancing up the slope, the Bernese-allies being
opposed by the Burgundian infantry levies. As soon as the enemy commenced
their foreward movement, the Swiss phalanxes rolled downhill.
The pikes soon overbore the infantry, the center giving way first, then
the Burgundian left. With absolute control, the victorious formations
were faced to their left, where the halberd-armed troops of Uri, Schwyz,
and Unterwalden were hard pressed to withstand the cavalry charges
of
the enemy, as the Burgundian lances outreached the infantrymen’s pole
arms. The Berners and their associates took the horsemen in the flank
and rear. To the Burgundians credit, they made an attempt to break
into
the pike formations before fleeing the field as their footmen had done
before them. While von Erlach had given the Confederates the advantage
of terrain, it was discipline and hard fighting, coupled with the
tactic of employing three phalanxes, which won the day. If adversaries
of the Swiss and proponents of cavalry over infantry thought that
perhaps it was a fluke combination of terrain advantage and horsemen
who fought without bravery, another Courtrai, they would find out
otherwise soon enough.
Sempach was an interesting experiment in fighting against the
Swiss by use of similar tactics. Leopold III, Duke of Austria, invaded
Confederate territory and came upon the Vorhut of Lucerners which
was some distance from the balance of the army. He dismounted his armored
cavalry and took the initiative by attacking and nearly defeating
the Swiss phalanx, using his lance as pikes. As the crucial moment,
the
Gewaltshaufen and Nachhut arrived to relieve the first formation, so
Leopold attempted to bring his second “battle” into play, also dismounted.
The two Swiss divisions meanwhile formed a Kiel (wedge) —
a phalanx of extra depth to break an exceptionally strong enemy line
or
unit. The Austrian advance was ragged and disordered, for they were
not trained infantry, and before they could come up the Swiss broke
the
first Austrian “battle” and impacted upon the disorganized second.
The
third group, seeing that the day was lost, turned and rode off, leaving
their fellows, and the Duke, to their fate. Obviously, the armor and
weapons of the feudal cavalry allowed them to successfully contend
with the Swiss halberdiers, but a cavalry force is seldom so well trained
as
to be able to perform well as infantry, “hobilars” in medieval terms.
Similarly, armored footmen would be hopelessly outmaneuvered by the
Swiss. However if such a force could be sufficiently trained and disciplined
the results would be distinctly unfavorable to the Swiss. The
leaders of the Confederates realized the danger and ordered that more
pikes be included in all future levies.
The Confederates were left more-or-less unmolested for over 30
years, and during this time they extended their territory by diplomatic
maneuvers. These gains inspired neighbors to attempt to rectify matters
and perhaps gain Switzerland in the bargain. Confederate expansion
southwards caused the Duchy of Milan to declare war, and in 1422 the
Battle of Arbedo was fought. The wily condottiere Francesco Bussone
(Carmagnola) with a force of 6,000 gendarmes (heavy cavalry)
faced a
Swiss force of only 4,000. The latter drew up into a single block,
and the
initial Milanese attack was repulsed bloodily and with ease. Carmagnola
then dismounted his troops, and the heavily armored men formed a
phalanx similar to that of their adversaries and fell to with lance,
sword,
and like arms pitted against the Swiss force of halberdiers. Better
armor
and longer weapon so mauled the confederates that one of the chief
leaders of the Swiss indicated that he was prepared to surrender, but
the
Milanese refused to offer quarter to people who would not give it to
others, so the fight continued. The Swiss were near the breaking point
when the Milanese saw a body of Swiss troops cresting a nearby rise,
and
Carmagnola drew his men back to await further developments. The unit
was but 600 men, a body of foragers returning to the main party, but
their timely appearance allowed the battered Confederates to withdraw
from the battle. Only one-third of the entire force at Arbedo (troops
from
the Forest Cantons, Lucern, and Zug) did not bear halberds. Of that
third, only about half were pikemen, the balance crossbowmen. The
Milanese lost more than the Swiss, but proportionately the battle was
a
disaster for the Conferedates. For the immediate time they hastily
drew
up instructions for the relegation of the halberd to the interior of
the
phalanx for use only when the unit was locked in melee. Some 50 years
in the future they would settle matters with Milan.
At Saint Jacob-en Birs a small body of 600 or so pikemen crossed
the river to attack an army of 15,000 invading French. This small
phalanx broke the enemy line, but were then surrounded. By dint of
repeated cavalry charges and showers of crossbow quarrels, the Swiss
finally died to a man, but they refused to surrender, and the French
lost
some 2,000 men in the fight. Thereafter, the Dauphine turned back to
France, giving up his plans of conquest in Switzerland.
Hericourt, Grandson, Morat, and Nancy were the four major battles
which caused Charles, Duke of Burgundy, to be named the Rash
rather than the Bold. The Swiss used their normal echelon of three
divisions
at Hericourt and soundly defeated the Burgundian force opposing
them. At Grandson, the Vorhut again advanced too quickly, and the
men of Bern, Basel, Schwyz, and Fribourg were set upon by the finest
cavalry in Charles’ army — which was so easily repulsed that the column
began to move down slope to test their strength against the rest of
the
Burgundians there! Charles thought to perform another Cannae, and
he sent orders to his center to pull back so as to form a pocket into
which
the advancing Swiss would rush. The Burgundian army was composed
of their own knights and foot and in addition had contingents of English
longbowmen, German arquibusiers, Italian stradiot (light) cavalry,
and
Flemish pikemen. As the Vorhut neared contact, however, the other
two divisions finally appeared upon the shoulders of Mount Aubert.
The
Burgundian forces panicked and fled, mistaking the retirement of the
center group for a retreat. Lacking any cohesion, Charles’ army was
beaten without a real fight. At Morat, the Swiss managed to march
across the Burgundian front because Charles failed to put out any
scouts, and the results were defeat in detail and slaughter of the
Burgundians.
At Nancy, the final battle, the Swiss again showed great tactical
skill, fixing the attention of the Burgundians with the Gewaltshaufen
and
Nachhut while the Vorhut moved through a woods to come upon the
Burgundian flank; they were again defeated in great detail and Charles
was cut down by a blow from a halberd while trying to rally his troops.
A greatly inferior force of Swiss broke the Milanese army invading
the Ticino Valley at Giornico, avenging Arbedo and causing their
already high repute to soar. The battles against the Swabians at
Frastenz, Calven, and Dornach were typical of Swiss bravery and determination
and lack of clever tactics. The straight onset of pikes typically
won each battle, and again the repute of the Swiss as the finest infantry
in the field was universally acclaimed. But there were many imitators
of
Swiss tactics — German landsknechte, French landsquenets, Italian
pikemen, Flemish pikemen — and these troops were hard to beat,
especially the Germans. Although the Swiss were never bested by landsknechte
on a fair field, they were certainly slaughtered by them at La
Bicocco, and each victory cost the Confederates dearly in lives. Furthermore,
tactics were improving, and artillery, the greatest foe of the mass
formation was coming into its own. Without adaptation, the Swiss were
doomed, and they refused to change, relying on the tried and true when
they were outmoded. This is not to say that the pikeman was finished
on
the battlefield, for that would be an obviously stupid assertion. Pikemen
were to play a part in battles for many decades to come, but such arms
could only survive in a balanced force of missile infantry, cavalry,
and
artillery as well. The Swiss still served as mercenary pikemen, but
never
after La Bicocca and Pavia V were they the dominant force in a battle.
The organizational structure of the Swiss certainly should have
enabled them to be tactically flexible. The divisions of a field force
could
be massed into a huge column, form a hollow, moving square, and
otherwise perform with perfect discipline in battle. The Swiss used
light
infantry with great effect, deploying them as skirmishers to both weaken
the enemy and draw musketry and artillery fire upon themselves while
the phalanx columns marched to impact unmolested. The three
echeloned divisions had the advantages of multiple impact, flank protection,
and reserve all rolled into one. Left, center, right, or any combination
could be refused until the Swiss chose. Of course, the Confederates
had no cavalry, to speak of, and this was a drawback, but not a
serious one until Spanish sword and buckler infantry arrived on the
scene. The early victories of the pike formation over virtually all
opponents
undoubtedly built an illusion of invincibility in the minds of the
Swiss — common soldier and captain alike — for they triumphed with
such relative ease. Had another von Erlach arisen perhaps there could
have been a redemption of the Swiss military reputation, but it was
not to
be. Besides, the free-thinking and highly independent mountaineers
would probably have paid no attention in any event. So later battles
consisted
of simply bringing the pike column before the enemy, “aiming” it
at the desired spot, and sending it foreward to whatever fate awaited,
trusting to the fighting ability and stubborness of the soldiery to
overcome
everything in the way. Thinking commanders eventually
discovered ways to defeat such tactics (or lack thereof). The era of
the
Swiss pikeman came to a close at the dawn of the Renaissance, although
it took the terrible results of battles such as Marignano to finally
prove it to
all concerned.
Bibliography
Those interested in further reading are recommended to:
A DICTIONARY OF BATTLES. David Eggenberger
HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 2 vols.
C.W.C. Oman
HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR IN THE XVI CENTURY.
C.W.C. Oman
THE ART OF WAR. Niccolo Machiavelli
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA. Eleventh Edition, vol. 26
Those wishing to experiment on the table top with miniatures to
recreate the Swiss battles are recommended to:
CHAINMAIL. Gary Gygax & Jeff Perrer
These medieval miniatures rules were carefully researched to
assure close simulation of the type of battles common to the Swiss
pikemen.