The power of the atom has a profound effect
on modern affairs
and on global intrigue. The existence of
atomic bombs has brought
great nations to a stalemate. Superpowers
now fight their battles in
lesser countries and by undercover means.
Radiation has also offered
a frightening new opportunity to terrorists.
Even without a
nuclear bomb, individuals can kill thousands
of people by releasing
radioactive substances in populated areas.
Obviously, agents in a
TOP SECRET® game campaign may
have to deal with these
events.
Extreme caution must be exercised in nuclear
situations. To excerpt
from the TOP SECRET Companion, page 63:
?Agents will
never be issued any type of chemical, biological
or radiological (nuclear)
warfare device. If such devices are encountered
in the field,
agents should make no attempt to disarm
or contain the devices.
Proper authorities . . . should be notified
at once, even at the risk of
jeopardizing a delicate mission. . . .
Caution supersedes political or
national allegiance.?
In the TOP SECRET game, an agent's role
is to protect mankind
from the misuse of nuclear devices. The
appearance of the particular
dangers of radiation in a campaign requires
that the Administrator
be familiar with nuclear effects.
The nature of radiation
All matter is made up of infinitesimal
particles called atoms.
These atoms themselves are composed of
a central massive nucleus
of smaller particles called protons and
neutrons. The nucleus is
surrounded by yet tinier particles called
electrons. Some atoms are
unstable and drop off their various components.
These jettisoned
particles are known as radiation. Radiation
cannot be smelled,
heard, seen, felt, or tasted. It is detected
only by instruments, the
geiger counter being most common.
After a period of such particle loss, a
substance becomes more
stable and less radioactive. Thus, radioactive
materials are assigned
a half-life, a period after which they
emit only half as much radiation
as they did previously. Note that two half-lives
do not make a whole;
a substance is not safe after two half-lives
have passed. Each time the
half-life elapses, only half as much radiation
is emitted, so a substance
never becomes entirely nonradioactive.
A radionuclide is
considered inert for most purposes after
ten half-lives have expired.
Each element is also assigned a biological
half-life, a measurement
used when a person is contaminated with
that element?s radiation.
The biological half-life is used in the
same way as the physical halflife,
but it is based on the rate at which a
living body excretes the
material. The table below lists the uses
of common radioactive materials
and their half-lives (y = years, d = days).
| Substance | Use/Location | Half-Life | Biological |
| Californium-252 | radiography, medical | 2.65 y | 2.2 y |
| Cesium-137* | waste, fallout | 30.5 y | 11 d |
| Cobalt-60* | radiotherapy, tracing, radiography | 5.3 y | 9.5 d |
| Hydrogen-3* | fusion byproduct | 12 y | 12 d |
| Iron-55* | used reactor material | 2.7 y | 2.2 y |
| Iodine-131* | medical, fallout, waste | 8 d | 7 d |
| Plutonium-239 | bombs, power, waste | 24,000 y | 44 d |
| Polonium-210 | bomb components | 138 d | 46 d |
| Radon-222 | uranium tailings | 3.8 d | ** |
| Radium-226 | tracing, radiography, radiotherapy | 1622 y | 43.8 y |
| Sodium-24* | used breeder coolant | 1 d | 1 d |
| Strontium-90* | medical, fallout, waste | 28 y | 175 y |
| Uranium-235 | bombs, power, waste | *** | 300 d |
| Uranium-238 | mining, U-235 byproduct, plutonium production | **** | 15 d |
There are three sorts of atomic radiation:
alpha, beta and gamma.
Alpha particles consist of a neutron and
a proton, making them
rather large on the subatomic scale. This
size also makes them easy
to screen out; a piece of paper can stop
alpha radiation. Beta rays
can penetrate paper, but are stopped by
metal foil. These particles
are individual electrons. Gamma rays are
not particles. This emission
is similar to visible light and X-rays.
A gamma ray is extremely
energetic and can penetrate as much as
2 inches of lead or 3 feet of
concrete.
Nuclear reactions
Atomic fission can occur in certain large
nuclei. In fission, an
emitted neutron strikes the nucleus of
another atom, knocking more
radiation loose. If enough fissionable
material is concentrated together
(forming a critical mass), the newly liberated
particles strike
other nuclei, and the process continues
in a chain reaction. The
atoms involved are transmuted into other
materials. This atomsmashing
converts matter into huge amounts of energy,
just as Einstein
predicted. If fission is rapid, it creates
a colossal explosion, as
in an atomic bomb. In an atomic power plant,
some neutrons are
absorbed by control rods, keeping the reaction
manageable but
creating sufficient heat to drive the motor
for a generator, submarine,
spacecraft, etc.
There are two elements which may be used
for this process. One
is uranium-235, and as little as 37 lbs.
of it may undergo fission.
The critical mass of plutonium is only
22 lbs. In nuclear facilities, a
critical mass is sometimes formed by accident.
The resulting explosion
is called a criticality, which is as destructive
as the detonation of
1-10 lbs. of plastique explosive. The area
affected by the blast becomes
contaminated (as described below).
Fusion reactions involve heating atoms until
their nuclei fuse
together, creating heavier elements. This
produces much more energy
than fission. Fusion is the process utilized
in hydrogen bombs,
and is what keeps the sun and stars alight.
At present, temperatures
high enough for fusion may be artificially
generated only by nuclear
fission. Attempts have been made at controlled
fusion, but to date
they have been unsuccessful.
The hazards
of radiation
When an atom is struck by radiation,
it is altered in various ways
due to the impact. Chiefly, electrons are
knocked from the atom?s
?shell,? creating an ion (an atom with
an electrical charge). Thus,
nuclear emissions are sometimes called
ionizing radiation. When
atoms in a living cell are ionized, the
cell is damaged. Obviously,
then, high-intensity radiation can kill
an organism. Even when less
potent, this altering of cells can cause
cancer and genetic mutation.
There are many methods of measuring radiation
in science. The
system most applicable to TOP SECRET gaming
uses the rad, or
radiation-absorbed dosage. The actual formulas
for determining
radiation intensity are much too complicated
for game play. Therefore,
intensity numbers are assigned to common
radioactive elements.
These are not exact figures, but are designed
to account for
biological hazard as well as actual radiation
emitted. Iodine-131, for
example, binds to the thyroid gland, and
for that reason is quite
dangerous.
| Substance | Alpha intensity | Beta intensity | Ganna intensity |
| Californium-252 | 5 | 0 | 1 |
| Cesium-137 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Cobalt-60 | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| Hydrogen-3 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Iron-55 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Iodine-131 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| Plutonium-239 | 7 | 0 | 2 |
| Polonium-210 | 5 | 0 | 3 |
| Radon-222 | 5 | 0 | 3 |
| Radium-226 | 4 | 0 | 2 |
| Sodium-24 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Strontium-90 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Uranium-235 | 4 | 0 | 2 |
| Uranium-238 | 4 | 0 | 1 |
A number of rads equal to the intensity
number is emitted by one
gram of radioactive material during one
hour. Thus, a gram of
cobalt-60 emits two rads of beta particles
and four rads of gamma
radiation in sixty minutes. There are 28.35
grams in one ounce;
thus, a pound of cobalt-60 yields 2721.6
rads per hour (907.2 rads of
beta, 1814.4 rads of gamma)! This dosage
is quite fatal. Radiation
intensity is inversely proportional to
the square of the distance between
the source and recipient. Since intensity
numbers are figured
for 5?, at 10? the intensity would be one-quarter.
At 15?, one-ninth
normal strength would be received. Actual
contact with radioactive
materials is covered below.
Radiation poisoning
When exposed to large amounts of radiation,
agents suffer acute
radiation syndrome. Details of this are
given below. Radiation damage
is cumulative over one year's time, so
an agent who receives ten
rads a day for thirty days is affected
as if he had suffered 300 rads.
With dosages under 2,000 rads, no effects
are felt for 1-10 hours.
5-199 rads: No symptoms of acute
radiation syndrome are felt at
this stage, but genetic damage and cancer
may be a threat. For
every live rads received, there is a 1%
chance that the agent will die
of cancer in 3-30 years. This probability
cannot exceed 40%. The
same check must be made to determine genetic
damage in any offspring
of the victim, with results applied by
the Administrator as
seen fit.
200-399 rads: The agent suffers nausea,
reducing his coordination
and physical stamina by 50%. This effect
lasts for one day per 100
rads. His immunity system is depressed,
and there is a 5% chance of
contracting an incidental disease, reducing
his physical strength by
10%. After seventeen days, hair loss and
skin hemorrhages occur.
Charm is reduced by 30% for 1-100 weeks.
Also, over seventeen
days, the agent?s life level drops down
to half. If untreated, there is a
10% chance of death for every 100 rads
received. Death occurs
twenty days after the exposure. If the
agent survives, life levels may
be regained normally. Other saves must
be attempted to avoid cancer
or genetic damage. Treatment, including
blood transfusions,
sedatives, and antibiotics, may prevent
fatalities and incidental
diseases.
400-1999 rads: All symptoms are described
above, but without
therapy the agent dies in twenty days.
If treatment is available, a
save vs. radiation may be attempted using
the above system (10%
chance of death per 100 rads). Exposures
over 900 rads are always
fatal.
2000 + rads: The agent loses consciousness
in 1d10 minutes and
dies within 1d10 hours.
Contamination
An agent who physically contacts radioactive material may become
contaminated with it. Worse yet, contamination
may be spread
to whomever or whatever the victim contacts.
A person is contaminated
by direct contact with radioactive material,
by entering a
contaminated area, or by contacting contaminated
objects or people.
If an agent is contaminated, the Administrator
generates a contamination
number by rolling percentile dice
and applying modifiers.
Use of a gas mask or scuba mask reduces
the die roll by half
(x½). Swallowing or inhaling the
material adds 50 to the result. The
contamination number is then used to get
a digit between one and
four (01-25 = 1; 26-50 = 2; 51-75 = 3;
76-00 = 4). The result is
multiplied by the sum of the material?s
intensity numbers for each
form of radiation (alpha, beta and gamma).
The total is the amount
of rads received by the agent in one day.
If the agent contacts more
than one substance at a time, the initially
generated contamination
number is used for each material. A contamination
number never
exceeds 100%.
Atomic installations have radiation alarms
at their doors. If an
agent triggers an alarm and is captured,
he is then stripped of all
clothes (possibly revealing weapons, stolen
materials, etc.) and vigorously
scrubbed. This scrubbing is painful and
results in a loss of
five Coordination points for one day. Any
contaminated objects are
disposed of. Decontamination subtracts
50 from the agent?s contamnation
number. If the contamination number was
greater than 50%)
what contamination remains is internal
and may not be spread,
although the agent still suffers exposure.
This radiation is halved
with each expiration of the biological
half-life. Certain drugs cause
internal contamination to be purged twice
as rapidly, but they also
reduce physical strength by 5% while treatment
lasts.
One important exception to the above concerns
plutonium-239.
Once this substance is ingested, in almost
any amount, the person is
as good as dead. Plutonium-239 comes to
rest on the inside of bones,
where blood-cell manufacture occurs in
the marrow. Once here, it
completely destroys all blood cells around
it, killing the victim in
1d10 days. No other known substance is
as dangerous and toxic as
plutonium, and agents who are aware that
such material exists in
their immediate area should exercise extreme
caution. No antidote
or treatment exists that will reverse this
substance's effects.
Reactors and accidents
Nuclear reactors contain huge amounts of radioactive material. If
an atomic plant were damaged, by accident
or design, the local areas
would be devastated by radiation. Direct
rupture of the reactor is
fortunately difficult. The fuel is held
in metal fuel rods and the entire
fuel assembly is contained by a reactor
vessel of 10? steel, in a
building of 1?-thick steel. The whole plant
is then covered by 3? of
reinforced concrete. However, the temperature
at which a nuclear
power plant operates is so great that,
if not cooled, the reactor vessel
would melt through the floor (the famed
"China Syndrome"). Not
only would this release radioactive material,
but, if the sinking core
struck water, a huge steam explosion would
result.
There are three common methods of cooling
a reactor. The most
usual is the boiling-water reactor (BWR).
In it, water is simply
pumped in to be boiled and create steam,
which is used to power a
generator. Pressurized water reactors (PWRs)
are also common. A
PWR keeps its coolant under pressure great
enough to keep it from
boiling. The cooling pipes then exchange
heat with water contained
elsewhere, producing steam. Nuclear ships
use this form of reactor.
In a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor
(HTGCR), normal fuel
rods are not used. This plant uses cooling
gas which is pumped
through a core of graphite and uranium
carbide. The gas heats
water, which drives a steam generator.
The experimental breeder reactor is more
dangerous. In it, the
reaction is blanketed with uranium-238,
which is thereby transmuted
to fissionable plutonium. This form of
plant runs at much
higher temperatures than previously described,
and must be cooled
by liquid sodium. The coolant in the reactor
becomes radioactive.
This means that its temperature must first
be transferred to nonradioactive
sodium, preventing contamination of the
environment. The
nonradioactive sodium heats water, producing
steam. Sodium explodes
on contact with water, so any leak can
result in a meltdown.
Every effort should be made to prevent terrorists
from destroying
atomic plants. But should it occur in a
campaign, this table may be
used for results.
Meltdown effects
| Plant type | Meltdown chance | Area contaminated | Explosion chance |
| B W R | 60% | 1-100 sq. miles | 40% |
| P W R | 50% | 1-100 sq. miles | 50% |
| HTGCR | 60% | 1-100 sq. miles | 60% |
| Breeder | 85% | 2-200 sq. miles | 85% |
The meltdown chance is the likelihood of
a disaster should the
primary cooling system be impaired. If
a plant melts down, the
indicated number of square miles become
contaminated. Explosions
destroy normal structures and cause 5-50
points damage in a radius
of 200-2000 yards. At up to twice the rolled
distance, 1-10 points
damage is inflicted. If an explosion occurs,
the maximum area is
always contaminated. The contaminating
materials are strontium-
90, cesium-136, iodine-131, uranium-235,
plutonium, and, in
breeders, uranium-238.
Usage of atomic material
Although use of nuclear warfare devices
is strictly taboo, there are
nuclear procedures that our agents may
carry out. Likewise, foes
may use these methods, and agents should
be aware of them. X-rays
are usually used to detect concealed objects,
but they can only detect
suitably dense objects located within soft
material (such as a gun in a
suitcase). Californium neutron radiography
is a superior ?X-ray?
method. This allows clear examination of
the contents of all containers,
but it is not sensitive to changes in color
(it won?t allow the
reading of sealed documents, for example).
Also, californium is
highly radioactive and may not be transported
in the field. Objects
larger than 2 square feet cannot fit into
the CNR device.
Assassins could well take a leaf from terrorists
and expose opponents
to damaging radiation dosages. However,
this method is only
tolerable in extreme situations. Caution
must be exercised, since the
handling of nuclear material may leave
a trail of contamination. The
Administration will never issue radioactive
material to agents for
this purpose.
Dilute radium powder has been used for some
time as a tracer. An
object or person may be contaminated, so
the subject?s movements
can be followed with a geiger counter.
More is said on this in the
TOP SECRET rulebooks. The radiation involved
is harmless, but it
may trigger alarms in nuclear facilities.
Safety precautions
Alpha and beta radiation can be blocked without much difficulty.
For this reason, those who must work with radioactive materials
wear protective clothing. The clothing is of 2 types, either dense
rubber or tissue paper. Both forms prevent contamination unless
damaged. Rubber clothing blocks all alpha particles, and beta
particles. It may be washed and reused. Paper clothing merely
regulates alpha exposure. It is discarded after use and is ruined
if wet or torn.
As well as protection, these uniforms set workers off from intruders.
Those caught within a nuclear faciility without a proper uniform
must fool their captors, or, failing that, evade them to avoid arrest.
If protective clothing of this nature is used, the appropriate
changes must be made when calculating the total intensity numbers
for radiation to which a contaminated agent has been exposed.
Thus, no alpha radiation amounts are considered for an agent who
is wearing paper protective clothing, and so forth.
Great care must be taken to isolate nuclear material. When being
transported, it is kept in reinforced lead-lined containers, requiring
24 stickes of dynamite or 2.5 lbs. of plastique to break.
While being processed, highly radioactive substances are kept in
gloveboxes. These are sealed window boxes with affixed rubber
gloves extending inwards. The air within the box is kept at low
pressure, so that if the box is punctured, outside air is sucked inwards,
allowing less radioactive material to escape. Gloveboxes and
traveling containers block all radiation unless damaged.
To detect radiation leaks, nuclear workers wear film badges.
These are chips of photographic film worn
like jewelry or on one?s
outside shirt pocket. Radiation exposes
the film, alerting officials to
leaks. In some cases pencil dosimeters
are worn. These are pen-sized
cylindrical tubes that give immediate readings
on radiation received.
Obtaining radioactive
material
Obviously, every effort must be made to
keep terrorists and other
undesirables from possessing radioactive
substances. Thus, the
methods that might be used by nuclear thieves
must be understood.
It would be difficult to steal radioactive
material from a nuclear
facility without setting off a contamination
alarm. Lead shielding is
not helpful, since nuclear facilities are
also protected by metal detectors.
Precautions taken by facilities vary, though,
and it is not impossible
for unauthorized persons to obtain radioactive
substances.
No nuclear installation is invulnerable
to having its managers
bribed, for example.
Because of the extreme danger, careful records
are kept of the
location of radioactive materials. Users
of radiation must submit
these to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
If any discrepancy
occurs, a thorough search of the plant
is made. Pipes are flushed
with acid, and the area is patrolled with
geiger counters. Some material
is never found, and it is declared MUF
(material unaccounted
for). So far, 8,000 lbs. of plutonium have
been reported missing.
Since radioactive materials are so desirable
to terrorists, agents are
advised to do their own research on MUF
incidents, infiltrating
nuclear facilities and tailing shipments.
Atomic terrorists may well
leave a trail of contamination, allowing
them to be followed with
geiger counters.
Rapid decommissioning
In war zones, nuclear reactors are very
dangerous. Not only could
they be ruptured, releasing radiation,
but enemies who gain control
of them could conceivably build atomic
bombs. It is imperative that
such facilities be destroyed. This has
actually occurred. In April
1975, as the government of South Vietnam
collapsed, its one nuclear
power plant was secretly dismantled by
a team of Americans. The
fuel assembly was lifted from the reactor
vessel (using the crane
provided for refueling) and flown to the
United States. Then the
reactor building was dynamited.
If this is done properly in the game, only
one square mile is contaminated,
with iron-55. However, the removed fuel
rods are extremely
radioactive. Each contains 2-20 lbs. of
each product listed in
the section on reactor accidents, except
for uranium-235, of which
there is 5-500 lbs. Disposal of these rods
must be left to authorities
not connected with an agent's Administration.
Location of nuclear material
Uranium is mined under low security, as it is quite impure. After
mining, it is purified to yellow cake, an earthy yellow material.
The
sandy waste materials are known as tailings and emit radon gas.
Almost 90% of yellow cake is useless uranium-238. In order to
separate the useful uranium-235, yellow cake is shipped to a
gaseous diffusion plant, where it is converted to uranium hexaflouride,
a gas. This is then run through a huge network of barriers
until the lighter uranium-235 rises to the top. After this, the material
is converted to a metal again. At this point, protection from terrorists
is warranted.
At another point, the uranium-235 is formed into fuel rods or
explosives. The uranium-238 may be converted to plutonium by
neutron bombardment, but often it is discarded. After use in a
reactor, fuel rods may be reprocessed, yielding plutonium. However,
this process is presently suspended in the United States and performed
only in the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain. The many waste
products (see the section on reactor accidents
above, for a list of
common elements within reactors), must be disposed of permanently.
Terrorists may well attempt to raid waste dumps, since these materials
are extremely deadly, if not fissionable.
Research labs and large universities often possess radioisotopes
and even small reactors. If a terrorist group is known to be seeking
nuclear material, these institutions should be monitored. In addition,
radiography is performed in many industries. Hospitals and
medical clinics usually own some radioactive materials.
Atomic bombs
There are two sorts of nuclear explosive:
gun bombs and shell
bombs. The gun bomb consists of a tube
with a conical piece of
uranium-235 at one end that may be fired
through the pipe with
conventional explosives. At the other end
is a round piece of
uranium-235, with a cavity to admit the
cone. Each piece weighs
slightly less than critical mass. To cause
an actual explosion, rather
than a criticality, a neutron-producing
alloy of beryllium and polonium
is applied to the uranium components. The
Hiroshima nuclear
weapon was a 13-kiloton uranium gun bomb.
The more advanced bomb type, the shell bomb,
uses several
wedge-shaped pieces of plutonium wrapped
with plastic explosive.
When the explosive detonates, each piece
is fired into place, forming
a ball and attaining a critical mass. In
addition to the beryllium
alloy, most shell bombs are wrapped with
uranium-238. This reflects
neutrons inwards, enhancing the explosion.
A hydrogen bomb consists
of a mass of deuterium (an isotope of hydrogen,
having only
one neutron) within a shell bomb.
Hydrogen bombs would be beyond the reach
of a terrorist, without
a factory, materials, and workers at his
disposal. But small
atomic bombs could conceivably be built
by small groups that obtain
the proper materials. In building a fission
(atomic) bomb, a terrorist
would need a supervisor with chemistry
and physics AOKs of 80 or
more. The bomb-builders must have a metalworking
shop, but
unless special precautions are taken, the
workers may be contaminated.
It requires 200 worker/days to build the
explosive. No more
than twenty workers may efficiently work
on the same bomb. The
supervisor of the group must check for
deactivation each day; if the
check is failed, the group is contaminated,
and the day?s work becomes
useless. After construction, the bomb must
be taken to the
target area and a means of detonation established.
A completed bomb can be as large as a 15'
long, 3' wide cylinder,
down to a 1' diameter sphere, depending
upon the level of sophistication
possessed by its builders. Size is of little
relevance in atomic
bomb manufacture; the key element is the
technological ingenuity
that goes into it.
Any means possible may be used to prevent
terrorists from building
an atomic bomb. Should it be built
in spite of all efforts, a lastminute
search of the target area may allow it
to be located and
disarmed. Disarming a bomb requires the
same AOK scores as
building one and takes 1-10 hours. At the
end of that time, the
disarmer checks deactivation. If it is
failed, those within 10' become
contaminated. If a 00 is rolled, the bomb
explodes with full power.
The consequences of even a small bomb's
detonation are tremendous.
Most sources estimate that a fission bomb
produced by terrorists
would have a yield measured in the tens
of kilotons at worst,
though the large industrial cities of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki were
obliterated by such "small" devices. [See
the accompanying article
on the effects of nuclear blasts for
more detail.]
Nuclear explosions occuring near or on the
ground produce great
quantities of radioactive debris, known
as fallout (since it falls out of
the sky as ash). The area covered with
fallout is contaminated with
the products listed in the section on reactor
accidents. Shell bombs
also spread uranium-238. The detonation
of any nuclear device
above ground or in shallow water will produce
the characteristic
mushroom cloud, which can reach altitudes
of up to 40,000' in the
case of a 20-kiloton device. This will
spread fallout over an enormous
range, usually thousands of square miles.
"Broken Arrows"
Nuclear weapons, like peaceful nuclear devices, have incredible
potential for disaster. Although a nuclear
bomb is unlikely to go off
in an accident (known in military lingo
as a "broken arrow"), contamination
of the crash area is likely. The study
of a damaged
weapon could reveal many elements of the
design of the weapon and
its weaknesses, making it vital that the
remains do not fall into enemy
hands. Likewise, enemy nuclear devices
should be recovered if
possible.
These incidents could occur on the arctic
icecap or other remote
areas. For example, a B-52 crashed near
Thule, Greenland, with
four plutonium bombs aboard in January
1965, scattering the plutonium
over a wide area of ice and snow. But "broken
arrows" may
occur in inhabited areas, as did the crash
of a B-52 with four
H-bombs near Palomares, Spain, in 1970.
Agents should be prepared
to search in any location.
Certain manned and unmanned spacecraft are
powered by SNAP
(space nuclear auxiliary power), deriving
electricity from the heat of
decaying plutonium. These satellites are
not usually sensitive to
national security, but accidents with them
may still require investigation,
or defense from enemy agents and terrorists.
The re-entry of
Cosmos 954, a Soviet spy satellite, over
Canada in 1978 scattered
nuclear material over a wide area, prompting
a major search-and-decontamination
mission known as Operation Morning Light.
Fortunately,
this area was only lightly inhabited. The
re-entry of Apollo
13's lunar module descent stage posed a
problem in April 1970, as it
contained a small nuclear plant aboard
it. (Had the Apollo 13 mission
not been aborted, the descent stage would
have been left safely
behind on the Moon.) However, the lunar
module was completely
destroyed upon re-entry, along with its
reactor. Similar events could
conceivably occur in the near future.
Atomic diplomacy
With the stakes so high, nations have made
agreements about
nuclear materials. It is very important
to monitor any nation suspected
of cheating in such a bargain. These are
several treaties that
should be monitored.
The ABM Treaty: Antiballistic missiles
have a profound effect on
nuclear strategy. Because of this, the
SALT treaty limited the number
of ABM installations to two per nation.
Since then, it has been
reduced to one. (The Soviets have an ABM
site at Moscow, but the
Americans have no ABM facilities at present.)
Should an agent
suspect that an ABM site is under construction,
he should gain proof
of it and then contact his Administration.
Since effective ABM
systems are extremely difficult to design,
it may be more useful to
have agents uncover the workings of an
ABM project than to immediately
halt its creation. Of course, such a project
could ruin the
world balance of power. Therefore, completion
of a new ABM system
must be prevented.
The Limited Test Ban Treaty: Both
the Soviet Union and the
United States have agreed not to test atomic
explosives, except
underground. This may be monitored by satellites,
but human
agents may be required to gain proof of
a test's "proper conduct."
Also, the Administration may be interested
in the data gained by the
enemy country in the test.
The Antarctica Treaty: It has been
suggested that nuclear waste
(which is hot from the temperature of nuclear
reactions) be placed
on the southern icecap and allowed to melt
a hole for itself. The hole
would then freeze over, burying the waste.
Due to environmental
concerns, this method has been forbidden.
This treaty is not directly
important to national security but may
yield clues to interesting
events. The South Pole is so remote that
a nation is unlikely to defy
agreements to dispose of waste there. But
the evidence from a
banned or secret project could well be
disposed of on the icecap, so
antarctic dumping could be a very important
thing to explore.
We cannot overlook the possibility that
another country might
export nuclear material to terrorists.
Agents must watch other nation's
nuclear dealings as closely as our own. Terrorists must be
prevented from having atomic capabilities.
Interfering here is a
touchy diplomatic situation, especially
when a hostile country is the
culprit. Extreme discretion is advised.
Running a nuclear
scenario
Throughout this article there are many
suggestions for missions
that agents might undertake. The Admin
should keep in mind the
hysteria that may occur if citizens learn
that nuclear terrorism is
taking place. Because of the dangers involved,
much more drastic
measures than usual can be tolerated in
twarting nuclear espionage
and terrorism. All in all, radiation cannot
be taken lightly in real life
and can have a powerful impact even in
a role-playing game.
Several TOP SECRET modules dealing
with radiation have been
published, in both DRAGON® Magazine
and by TSR, Inc. They
can be quite useful for reference and inspiration,
as well as being
excellent adventures in themselves. "Mad
Merc" (in DRAGON
issue #56) is a good example of
infiltration of an enemy nuclear
facility. It also gives rules for radiation
damage from a radioactive
materials vault, on page 45. Radiation
damage from a damaged
nuclear reactor is given on page 46. "Operation:
Whiteout" (in
DRAGON issue #87) is a good example
of the investigation of a
nuclear accident and possible treaty violations.
TS 008 Operation:
Seventh Seal is a good example of
the apprehension of terrorists who
are building a bomb (though of extreme
size).
Other suggestions for nuclear adventures
include the apprehension
of foreign agents who are stealing nuclear
secrets or material,
avoiding contamination by an enemy agent,
the decommissioning of
a facility that is near capture or has
been captured by hostile forces,
the infiltration of an enemy nuclear facility,
the ?protective? infiltration
of a nuclear facility, the investigation
of the corrupt staff of a
nuclear facility, the investigation of
a nuclear accident, the investigation
of treaty violations, and the recovery
of lost nuclear material.
Bibliography
Asimov, Isaac, and T. Dobzhansky. The Genetic Effects of Radiation.
Brodine, Virginia. Radioactive Contamination. *
Caldicott, Helen. Missile Envy. New York: Bantam, 1985. **
Department of Energy, U.S. Fallout. Oak Ridge, TN.
Department of Energy, U.S. Your Body
and Radiation. Oak
Ridge, TN.
Ford, Daniel. The Cult of the Atom: Secret
Papers of the Atomic
Energy Commission. New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1984.
Heaps, Leo. Operation Morning Light.
New York: Paddington
Press Ltd., 1978.
Hill, John W. and Fegil, Dorothy M. Chemistry
and Life. Minneapolis:
Burgess, 1983.
Hirschfelder, J.O., et. al., ed. The
Effects of Atomic Weapons.
Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press,
1950. *
Kahn, Herman. Thinking About the Unthinkable.
New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1984.
Kohn, Howard. Who Killed Karen Silkwood?
New York: Summit
Books, 1981. **
McPhee, John. The Curve of Binding Energy
New York: Ballantine
Books, 1979. **
Phillips, John A., and David Michaelis.
Mushroom: The True
Story of the A-Bomb Kid. New York:
Pocket Books, 1979. **
Rashke, Richard. The Killing of Karen
Silkwood. New York:
Penguin Books, 1982. **
Shapiro, Fred. Radwaste. New York: Random House, 1981. *
* -- These books contain explicit game-applicable
information
on the science involved.
** -- Although these books are quite controversial,
they contain a
lot of possibilities for scenarios.