From the steppe lands of Central Asia in the 13th century rode the
most successful totally warrior society the world has ever known.
Toughened by the rigorous climate, living on horseback, they had to
fight for every piece of ground they occupied. In the end their empire
would stretch from Eastern Europe through China and southward to the
Persian Gulf.

United by Genghis Khan (1162-1227), the Mongol Armies descended
upon a world too busy fighting among themselves to unite
against the new danger. The Chin emperors in China were politically
weak and unable to rally a military force sufficient to throw back the
Mongol wave. Europe was beset by a series of wars between the Papal
armies and those of the Holy Roman Empire. Russia and Poland were
subdivided into a series of weak feudal states, so distrusting of each
other that they could not unite even when the Mongols were upon
them. The Islam nations, when not fighting crusaders, fought among
themselves and failed to unite even when the religion itself was
endangered.

The chief European opponents of the Mongols were the Russian
states and Poland. The armies of the Russian states resembled those of
the 8th- and 9th-centuy Franks. Each noble possessed a small retinue
of horsemen clad in chainmail and equipped with lance and shield. The
real nucleus of the army was the infantry, armed with axe and spear.
The bow was never used in great numbers.

The usual Russian battle tactic was to draw up the army in front of a
palisaded camp, with the cavalry in the center and the infantry on the
wings and in the rear as a reserve. The decisive blow was struck by a
frontal cavalry charge, while the infantry was left on its own.

The Polish army was predominantly cavalry. Free yeomanry, which
was still prevalent in Russia, had practically ceased in Poland. All
landowners, from the humblest who owned but a few acres, to the great
barons who could put hundreds of vassals into the fields, were expected
to ride if danger existed. Predominantly lancers, the Poles had no
archers and little infantry. The rich nobles were equipped with complete
mail and an armored horse. The poorer nobles frequently wore a
leather jerkin and had no armor for their nags. The two principal classes
of warriors were light cavalry and heavy cavalry. 

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY
The Mongol Army was divided into multiples of tens. A division
(Tumen) consisted of 10,000 men. Each tumen was divided into ten
regiments of 1,000 men each (Minghans). A Minghan was subdivided
into ten squadrons (Jaguns) of 100 men each. The Jagun consisted of
ten troops (Arbans) of ten men each.

Determination of command was dependent upon unit size. Each
ten-man Arban selected its own commander. The ten Arban leaders
determined the Jagun commander. Commanders of the Minghans and
Tumens were appointed by the Khan and given the title of Noyan.

A typical army was composed of three or more cavalry Tumens
accompanied by several Minghans of artillery and engineers. An Army
was commanded by an Orlok.

The logistics of the army was the responsibility of the Yurtchis, who
chose camp sites and organized supplies and communications. The
Chief Yurtchi was of high rank and was also given the responsibility for
reconnaissance and intelligence. Each Arban was supplied with two or
three Yurts (tents made from felt stretched over a wooden frame and
also used as shelter by the warriors), to which food was distributed each
day.

The recruitment of the army was by a universal conscription system.
All men over the age of twenty except physicians and priests (of any
religion) were liable for military service.

ARMS AND ARMOR



The Mongol army was primarily a cavalry force consisting of 40%
heavy and 60% light cavalry. The basic uniform was either a blue or
brown tunic (Kalat). The blue kalats were faced in red around all
borders, collars and cuffs. The brown were similarly trimmed in light
blue. Officers’ uniforms were faced, with gold and silver thread running
through the facings. In winter, Kalats were lined and trimmed with fur.
Trousers were usually either grey or blue and lined with fur in winter.
Laced leather boots with no heels completed the uniform.

A coat of mail with a cuirass composed of oxhide or iron scales
covered armor consisted of a lacquered leather cuirass or a heavy
quilted kalat, and sometimes no armor at all.

Each Mongol warrior was required to wear a loose, raw silk undershirt.
The silk would be carried into any wound made by an arrow
without cutting the material. By gently lifting the twisted silk in the
wound and turning out the arrow along the same route that it had
entered the body, the wound was kept small, greatly improving the
wounded man’s chances for survival.

The battle headgear of heavy cavalry consisted of a conical iron
helmet. Chainmail frequently hung down, protecting the neck and the
sides of the face. A leather helmet of similar shape or a heavy quilted cap
with a thick, firm brim was worn by light cavaly. Design and decoration
of the caps varied by Tumen; the Uighur tumens, for instance, wore
black velvet with yellow cloaks. Fur trimmings of wolf, fox, badger and
monkey skins were worn by officers, in ascending order of rank. The
common warrior wore goat or dog pelts.

All warriors carried a shield. The Mongol shield was small and
circular, made of wicker covered by thick leather.

Each cavalyman carried two bows—one for long range, the other
for short range. The bow was his primary and most deadly weapon. The
pull of the bow varied from 100-160 pounds. It had a maximum range
of 350 yards (compared to 75 pounds pull and a range of 250 yards for
the English Longbow).

The Mongol bow was made from layers of horn and waterproofed
by lacquer. The layer nearest the warrior was composed of horn, the
furthest of sinew. Unstrung, its shape was like three-quarters of a circle.
Strung, the outer curve of the circle bent towards its center, forming a
double-curve configuration with ears at either end bending away from
the archer.

When released, the horn would snap back to its original shape while
the stretched sinew would contract, thus propelling the arrow faster and
with more power than a wooden bow. The Mongolian thumb lock (a
stone ring on the thumb) further increased the arrow’s velocity.

Arrows varied in size and shape, depending on use. Three “fast”
arrows, whose tips had been hardened by plunging their red-hot heads
into salt water, proved efficient at piercing armor. Whistling arrows were
used for signalling and identifying targets. Arrows tipped with tiny
grenades were put to good use as incendiary devices.

The Mongol warrior, carrying at least two quivers on his right side,
each containing a minimum of 60 arrows, soon mastered the art of
shooting arrows in any direction at a gallop. He carefully timed his
release between the strides of his horse so his aim would not be affected
by the horse’s hooves striking the ground. The results were as remarkable
as they were deadly.

Weapons supplementing the bow were quite varied. Heavy cavalry
were equipped with a scimitar (a long, curved-blade sword). A battle
axe or iron mace hung from the saddle. A twelve-foot-long lance with a
hook for yanking opposing warriors from their mounts was common. A
horsehair pennant usually hung from the lance. The light cavalry sword
was lighter and shorter. The lights carried two or three javelins. Roth
carried a lasso, used for pulling heavy equipment or roping an enemy
from the saddle. A dagger strapped to the inside left forearm was quite
popular.

SIEGE WARFARE
The Mongols’ inability to take walled cities during their initial incursion
into China drove home the need for siege artillery. The Mongols
quickly recognized the potential of the Chinese light and heavy catapults
and adapted them for their own use.

Requiring forty men (usually prisoners) to create sufficient tension
on the ropes, the light catapult was capable of hurling a two-pound
missile more than 100 yards. While this limited range could prove
extremely perilous to its crew, the piece had the distinct advantage of
being easily carried on the back of pack animals and quickly assembled.

The heavy catapult required a crew of more than 100 men. Capable
of launching a twenty-five-pound missile at ranges exceeding 150
yards, these engines were especially effective against fortified gates and
walls.

From the Khwarizmians the Mongols borrowed the counterpoise 
Trebuchet and Ballistae.  Operating upon the principle of counter-weights, 
the Trebuchet possessed an effective range of 350 yards or 
more.  



The Ballistae had the appearance of a giant crossbow and propelled 
a huge arrow @ ranges xceeding 150 yards with much greater 
accuracy than either the catapult or the Trebuchet.

The-Mongol use of this artillery was not limited to fortified targets.
Containers filled with burning tar were used to smokescreen troop
movements and confuse enemy concentrations. Grenades and fire
bombs were launched to harass enemy lines. Should an enemy withdraw
to a fortified position, siege engines were brought up. They were
concentrated on specific areas to create gaps for cavalry to exploit, or to
drive the enemy out in the open where the superior Mongol maneuverability
and firepower could be best employed.

Gunpowder wa also utilized by the Mongols;  the oldest Mongol 
cannon dates back to 1332.  Rockets made from bamboo wrapped in 
leather had range capabilities of more than 1,000 yards.  Fired several at 
at a Time from box-like launching platforms, they proved more of a harassing 
weapon than a destructive one. 

Most artillerymen were prisoners. The art of range determination
and firing the weapon was often handled by Chinese or Moslem
artillerists.

TACTICS
Entering battle, the Mongols advanced in 5 single ranks, the first
two heavy cavalry, the last three light cavalry. In front and on either flank
rode separate detachments of light cavalry. One of these would open
the attack Should an enemy advance against one of these units, this
detachment would become the vanguard and while the main body
deployed to join the battle, the nearest light cavalry detachment would
move quickly to protect the exposed flank.

Generally, light cavalry would not directly engage the enemy at
close quarters. Instead, they would ride across the front, showering the
front line with arrows and javelins. If gaps were opened, the light cavalry
would open ranks and the heavy cavalry would charge through. Should
the enemy front line remain firm, heavy cavalry would gallop around
behind the enemy and attack its rear.

Another favorite tactic was the use of the Mangudai, a light cavalry
corps of “suicide troops.” In a maneuver which was more a tribute to
their bravery than a tactical necessity, the Mangudai would charge the
enemy alone, feign confusion, and take flight. Their plan was to entice
the enemy to chase them into a carefully planned ambush which
frequently led to the annihilation of the opponent.

In 1221, on the plain of Khuman where the Berduj meets the Kura,
the Georgian Army of Giorgi Lasha (George IV), of over 70,000 men,
charged the Mongol army. The Mongols’ horses, faster than the Russian
mounts, kept ahead of the Georgians. Their ranks decimated by Mongol
firepower, their horses exhausted and their force scattered across the
plain, the Russian Army was vulnerable. After mounting fresh horses
and advancing under a screen of arrows, the Mongols formed a wedge
which was quickly driven through the Russian forces. All that remained
was the mopping up.

After gathering another army, George IV rode out to meet the
Mongols again. Thanks to keeping in close order and staying out of
range of the Mongol arrows, the Russians pushed part of the Mongol
Army into a pass. At that moment the remaining portions of the Mongol
Army, hiding in ambush, appeared and attacked the Russian rear as the
“retreating” Mongol army turned and charged the Georgian front line.
The Russians’ defeat was complete.

When totally outnumbered, the Mongols were adept at negotiating
a way out of difficult situations. Confronted by a much superior army of
Bulgars, Khazars, Alans and Cumans, the Mongols were forced to take
up defensive positions near the Bab al-Abwab Pass. At dawn one
morning, a Mongol ambassador rode into the Cuman camp with over
half of the Mongols’ horses and pack animals, laden with all their booty.
Thus bribed, the Cumans betrayed their allies, whose remaining army
was then destroyed by the Mongols

After the battle, the Mongols rode after the Cumans. They caught
them, decimated the army, executed its leaders, and recovered all their
horses and treasure.

At Dnieper, 10,000 Russians held a strongly fortified camp. For
three days, every Mongol attack was repulsed. At last, by offering to
negotiate a surrender and ransom, a Mongol detachment was allowed
into the camp. While the soldiers were off guard, the Mongols struck and
wiped out the camp, taking no prisoners.

When, in 1257,20,000 men of the Caliph of Baghdad rode out to
challenge the Mongols, Mongol soldiers broke dikes along the banks of
the Tigris, flooding their camp, cutting off any line of retreat, and
drowning a good portion of the detachment The few survivors were cut
down by the main attack that followed.

The toughness of the Mongol warrior often determined the outcome
of a battle. In 1221, at the Battle of Indus, the Turkish Army of Jellaluddin
took up an excellent defensive position beside the Indus, its flanks
protected by the mountains and a bend in the river. After being repulsed
in the front, Genghis Khan sent a tumen over apparently impassable
mountains to strike the Turkish flank Struck from two sides, the Turkish
defense collapsed.

Having grown soft from the riches of conquest, divided by fighting
among themselves for control of the Khanship, and facing a united Islam
and a Europe no longer divided, the Mongols ceased to be a threat to
Europe by the year 1290.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chambers, James, The Devil’s Horsemen, Morrison and Gibb, Ltd., 1979

Dupuy, R.Ernest and Trevor N., The Encyclopedia of Military History, Harper &
Row, 1977.

Lamb, Harold. The March of the Barbarians, Garden City, 1941.

Montgomery, A History of Warfare, World Publishing, 1968.

Oman, Charles, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, Burt Franklin, 1969.